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Government  secrecy has  been a  frequent source  of public concern
over the last two decades.  The bombing of Cambodia in  1969  was kept
secret from the public, as were the plans for the invasion of Grenada in
1985.  The Watergate scandal revealed a long list of abuses, not disclosed
to the public, in the domestic and foreign arenas.  The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act was intended to limit government control of information, but
the statute has hardly ensured  disclosure of all important governmental
practices and decisions.'  Claims that the first amendment  guarantees  a
right of access  to  information  held  by government  have  usually been
rejected.2
The practice of withholding information when important public pol-
icies  so require  is nothing  new;  the Constitution's  framers  themselves
kept their deliberations secret.  But an important strand in American tra-
dition leads  in the opposite  direction.  Woodrow  Wilson,  for example,
wrote that "government ought to be all outside and no inside....  [T]here
ought to be no place where anything can be done that everybody does not
know about."3
This  conflict  accounts  for the  tension  between  a widely  accepted
understanding  of the function  of the first amendment  and  the current
approach for accommodating the interest in disclosure  and the need for
secrecy.  The understanding, reflected  in Wilson's  statement and associ-
ated with Alexander Meiklejohn,4  is that the first amendment  is primar-
ily designed  to  ensure  citizen  deliberation  about  public  affairs.  Under
t  Professor of Law, University  of Chicago.  B.A.  1975, Harvard College; J.D.  1978, Harvard
Law  School.  This essay  is  a  revised  version  of a speech  delivered  on  the occasion  of the 200th
anniversary  of the John  Peter Zenger trial at a conference  sponsored by the Annenberg School of
Communications  and the University  of Pennsylvania  Law  School  in  October  1985.  The  author
would like to thank Albert A. Alschuler, Douglas Baird, Richard A. Epstein, James P. Holzhauer,
Richard  A.  Posner, Frederick  P.  Schauer,  Geoffrey  R.  Stone,  and  David  A.  Strauss for helpful
comments  on  an  earlier  draft.  Jeremy  Friedman  provided  valuable  comments  and  research
assistance.
1.  See  1 K. DAVIS,  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW  TREATISE  § 4.45, at 442-46  (2d ed.  1978).
2.  See, e.g.,  Pell  v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817  (1974);  Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843  (1974).
3.  W. WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM  113-14 (1913); see also id. at 130 ('Government  must, if
it is  to be pure and correct in  its processes,  be absolutely  public in everything  that affects  it.").
4.  See A.  MEIKLEJOHN,  FREE SPEECH  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  SELF-GOVERNMENT  24-27
(1948).  Others have  also based  arguments  on this model.  See, e.g.,  BeVier, The First  Amendment
and Political  Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,  30 STAN.  L. REV.  299
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this view, the citizenry must have a significant role in government  deci-
sions, and the guarantee of freedom of expression is intended above all to
promote that role.
The  approach  might  be  called  an  equilibrium  model  of the  first
amendment.  Under this model, government is under no general  obliga-
tion to disclose information, but the press may publish whatever material
it is able to acquire.  Sometimes the equilibrium approach is based on the
text and history of the first  amendment;5  sometimes it is  offered  as an
easily administered  system for accommodating the need for secrecy and
the value  of disclosure  without  sacrificing  either.6  In both  cases,  the
absence  of a  right of access  to information  held  by the government  is
balanced  by the power to publish  almost  all  information that has been
lawfully obtained.  The self-interested  behavior of countervailing forces,
it is thought, will produce an equilibrium that benefits the citizenry as a
whole.
This  Article  explores  whether  the  equilibrium  theory  adequately
accommodates the need for secrecy and the goal of ensuring citizen delib-
eration about issues of public importance.  After describing the principal
reasons for and against government secrecy, the Article explains why a
struggle between the press and the government is unlikely to produce an
acceptable  "equilibrium."  The Article  then discusses  government  con-
trol  of privately  generated  "technical  data"  and  of speech  by  public
employees, two sharply disputed first amendment issues.  An exploration
of these issues supports the general conclusion that the equilibrium the-
ory  serves neither the need for secrecy nor the value of public delibera-
tion  about public affairs.  The Article  concludes  with some  suggestions
for reformulation  of the equilibrium theory.
I
THE JEFFERSONIAN  MODEL  OF FREE  EXPRESSION
The popular understanding  of the function  of the first amendment
derives  from  a  conception  of  free  speech  associated  with  Thomas
Jefferson.7  The  premise of this  conception  is  that the  purpose  of free
5.  See BeVier, An  Informed Public, an Informing Press:  The  Search for a  Constitutional
Principle,  68  CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980).
6.  See A. BICKEL,  THE MORALITY  OF CONSENT  79-83  (1975).
7.  It  was  Jefferson  who,  among  the  Founders,  most  powerfully  emphasized  the  value  of
deliberative  processes  among  the citizenry.  For  a  general  discussion of Jefferson's  views,  see  H.
ARENDT,  ON REVOLUTION  234-42 (1963);  see also infra note 29 (noting Jefferson's regret  that the
framers closed  the Convention).  This position is distinct from that of Madison  and other prominent
writers at the time of the framing, who argued for deliberation  by representatives  rather than by  the
citizenry  as a whole.  See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38  STAN.  L.  REV.  29,
38-43  (1985).
The model has important competitors, which stress, among other things, the value of speech  in
promoting self-realization,  see Redish,  The  Value of Free Speech,  130 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  591  (1982);
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expression is to ensure to the extent possible that the citizenry will make
informed  decisions  on public  issues.  For intelligent  popular  decision-
making, there must be widespread public deliberation in advance.  Before
government sends  troops  to a foreign  country or regulates  risks in  the
workplace, there should  be an opportunity  for general  discussion.  The
Jeffersonian  model  thus  views  deliberation  as  a  critical  element  in  the
system of self-government.
Under this view,  one of the central functions of politics is the selec-
tion of social preferences, rather than the mechanical implementation  of
majority will.  Deliberative processes used by citizens and representatives
are the key elements in the system.8  For example, a law prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of race,  gender, or handicap  might derive,  not
from preexisting  private preferences, but from a decision, reached  after
public  discussion, that discrimination of that sort is unjustifiable.  More
generally, a law might reflect a decision that some preferences ought not
to be satisfied.9
This view,  of course,  implies  that the political  process  should not
always take private "interests"  for granted  and assume that the purpose
of the system is to aggregate  or balance those interests.  Properly under-
stood, the system is not one in which private groups press  their private
interests on government.  Instead, the Jeffersonian approach implies that
there  is  in some  contexts  a  common good,  emerging  after processes  of
free expression and debate, that is distinct from the aggregation or trade-
off of private preferences.  Public  deliberation,  helping to create  a polit-
ical community, is a crucial means of ensuring that the common good is
brought  about.10
Scanlon, A  Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB.  AFF. 204 (1972),  the contribution of
speech to the marketplace of ideas, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.  616,  630 (1919)  (Holmes,
J., dissenting),  and the role of speech in the discovery and spread of truth, see J. MILL, ON LIBERTY
31-67  (1859).  A  large  literature  attempts  to  explicate  one  or  another  of  these  various
understandings.  See,  e.g.,  L.  BOLLINGER,  THE  TOLERANT  SOCIETY  43-75  (1986)  (criticizing
classical  approaches);  F.  SCHAUER,  FREE  SPEECH:  A  PHILOSOPHICAL  ENQUIRY  15-72  (1982)
(analyzing  various  understandings  of  free  speech);  Bork,  Neutral Principles and  Some  First
Amendment Problems, 47  IND.  L.J.  1, 20-35  (1971)  (advocating  that constitutional  protection  be
extended only  to political  speech).
8.  Cf. Pitkin, Justice:  On Relating Private and Public, 9  POL.  THEORY  327,  342-46  (1981).
Pitkin suggests:  "Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, exercise the human capacity 'to
think what we are doing' and take charge of the history in which we are all constantly engaged by
drift and inadvertence."  Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
9.  The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is an apt metaphor. See J. ELSTER, ULYSSES  AND THE
SIRENS:  STUDIES  IN  RATIONALITY  AND  IRRATIONALITY  36-38  (1979)  (discussing
autopaternalism).  Note that this argument is not that some people may impose their preferences  on
others;  it  is  instead  that  people  may  decide  that  they  wish  to  ensure  that  their own  short-run
preferences are not satisfied.  Cf id. at 84-85  (discussion of persuasion); see also generally Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  (forthcoming  1986)  (discussing
private preferences  and the law).
10.  Cf Pitkin, supra note 8,  at  342-46 (discussing functions  of political  deliberation).  Pitkin
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Two general constitutional themes underlie the Jeffersonian  concep-
tion of free speech.  The first is the effort to ensure against self-interested
representation:  attempts  by  representatives  to  achieve  personal  goals
that diverge from the interests of the citizenry."  Public disclosure and
discussion operate as a check on the conduct  of representatives,  thereby
supplementing  electoral  control.12  Government  secrecy  should  be  dis-
trusted, for if information is withheld from the public, an important limi-
tation on self-interested  representation  will  be eliminated.
The second theme concerns the risk of usurpation of government by
private  factions.13  Public  discussion,  subjecting  both  governmental
processes  and private preferences to critical scrutiny, should reduce  the
likelihood  that powerful  private  groups will  have undue  influence  over
the processes  of government.  The first amendment  is  thus designed  to
make it more likely that government decisions will be a product of public
deliberation rather than factional pressure.  In both of these respects, the
amendment may be understood  as a  structural  provision, ensuring  cer-
tain government  processes;  its purposes  extend well  beyond the protec-
tion of private autonomy.
If the Jeffersonian model is accepted,  all material that communicates
is not, by virtue of that fact, entitled to the highest level of constitutional
protection,  demanding  a justification  from  government akin  to  that  set
out in the Pentagon  Papers  case. 4  Perhaps the clearest  example is com-
mercial  speech,'"  defined  as  advertising or speech that proposes a busi-
ness transaction.16  Commercial  speech is  not  entirely  deprived  of first
amendment  protection;  to regulate it, the government  must meet  some
notes, "What distinguishes public life is the potential for decisions  made not merely in  the name of
the whole community but actually by  that community  collectively,  through participatory  political
action,  and in  the common  interest."  Id. at 344 (emphasis in original).  Cf also J. ELSTER,  SOUR
GRAPES  33-42 (1983)  (discussing collective  rationality).
11.  Cf THE FEDERALIST  No. 47 (J. Madison),  No. 51  (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)  (risk  of
tyranny diminished by separation of powers); F. SCHAUER, supra note 7,  at 38-39, 43-44 (justifying
special  protection  of speech  with  reference  to  likelihood  that  government  will  be  acting  for
illegitimate reasons);  Blasi, The Checking Value in First  Amendment Theory,  1977 AM.  B.  FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 521 (free  speech  can  serve to check  abuse  of power).
12.  Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY  AND DISTRuST  105 (1980)  (first amendment rights are critical  to
functioning of democratic process).
13.  See THE  FEDERALIST  No.  10 (J. Madison).
14.  New York  Times  Co.  v.  United  States,  403  U.S.  713  (1971).  For  a description  of this
standard,  see infra text  accompanying  note 42.
15.  See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,  425 U.S.
748,  762  (1976)  (commercial  speech  entitled  to  some  first  amendment  protection);  Baker,
Commercial Speech:  A  Problem in the Theory ofFreedom, 62  IOWA  L.  REV.  1 (1976)  (arguing
against  constitutional  protection  of commercial  speech);  Jackson  & Jeffries,  Commercial Speech;
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,  65 VA.  L.  REV.  1 (1979)  (same).
16.  Cf Central  Hudson Gas & Elec.  Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,  447 U.S. 557, 561  (1980)
(commercial speech  defined as "expression  related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience").
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burden of justification.  That burden, however, is substantially less severe
than the Pentagon Papers standard. 7  The reason for the lower  level of
protection is that commercial  speech is far removed from the central con-
cerns of the first amendment;  as a result, the government need not meet
the usual heavy burden of justification.' 8
The Jeffersonian  model is also extremely  optimistic about the effects
of free speech.  Some have suggested that this optimism is unwarranted
in light  of the ability of representatives  and private groups to structure
public discussion  so that it is threatening to neither of them. 9  Public
and  private  power  inevitably  weakens  the  autonomy  of  deliberative
processes;  open  discussion,  while  formally  egalitarian,  gives  some  fac-
tions an opportunity to dominate the process.2"  In these circumstances,
the Jeffersonian  model should be treated as aspirational rather than as a
reflection of actual practice.
Finally, the Jeffersonian model oversimplifies the constitutional  sys-
tem, which delegates  authority  to representatives  as well as to  citizens.
Political decisions are generally made not by the people  themselves, but
17.  For  example,  commercial  speech  may  be  suppressed  simply  because  it  is  false  or
misleading.  See  id. at  563-64.  A  recent  United  States  Supreme  Court  case  suggests  highly
deferential review of legislative regulation of commercial speech.  Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism  Co. of Puerto  Rico,  106  S.  Ct. 2968  (1986).
18.  This theme is of course a familiar one in first amendment doctrine.  Obscenity, for example,
is subject to regulation on a similar ground, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)
(obscenity not protected as it is "utterly  without redeeming social  importance"); see also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S.  15, 20-24 (1973)  (reaffirming Roth), as are false statements of fact, see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974),  "fighting  words," see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S.  568, 571-74 (1942),  and  other categories of unprotected  speech.  See generally G. STONE,
M.  SEIDMAN,  C.  SUNSTEIN,  &  M.  TUSHNET,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  ch.  7  (1986)  (discussing
categories of low-value speech).
The controversial notion that some speech should be afforded less protection because of its "low
value"  is discussed infra, text accompanying  notes  76-79.
19.  See, eg., H. MARCUSE,  Repressive Tolerance,  in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81,  95-
97 (1965)  (arguing that relevant actors define debate so rigidly that outcome is foregone conclusion);
Clark, Liberalism and Pornography,  in PORNOGRAPHY AND  CENSORSHIP 45  (D. Copp & S.  Wendell
eds.  1983)  (the  "negative  liberty"  justification  for pornography  obscures  its role in preserving  the
preexisting inequality between  men and  women).
20.  See S.  LUKES,  POWER:  A RADICAL  VIEW 36-37  (1974);  MacKinnon,  Pornography,  Civil
Rights, and  Speech, 20 HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L. REv.  1 (1985)  (challenging traditional approaches in the
context  of  pornography,  where  "more  speech"  is  not  a  remedy);  Wright,  Politics and  the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE  L.J.  1001,  1013-19  (1976)  (justifying limits on political
contributions  by  arguing that  size  of contribution  not correlated  to intensity  of feelings  and that
uncontrolled  system  gives  undeserved  weight  to  wealthy,  organized  entities).  The  Jeffersonian
model,  seeking  to promote decisionmaking that  is  in  important  respects autonomous,  or  distinct
from  relations  of power,  is based  on  assumptions that  those engaged  in  debate  are  equal,  enjoy
mutual  respect,  and  have agreed  to the  terms of the discussion,  as in  Habermas's  "ideal  speech
situation."  See Habermas,  Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY  360, 371-
72 (1970).  For this reason  the model  is vulnerable  to critiques  stressing  the relationship between
knowledge and power.  See J. ELSTER, supra note  10, at 33-42; J. KEANE,  PUBLIC LIFE AND  LATE
CAPITALISM  184-86  (1984);  see  also  generally  M.  FOUCAULT,  POWER/KNOWLEDGE  (1980)
(discussing dependence of knowledge on constellations  of power).CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
by  officials who  are  subject to electoral  and other kinds of control.  In
these  circumstances it is hard to justify  the idea that full public disclo-
sure, in the interest of ensuring decision by the citizenry, is always neces-
sary  or  desirable.  The  Jeffersonian  understanding  thus  tends  to
undervalue the representative  character of the constitutional  scheme.
At the same time, however, the Jeffersonian  understanding properly
emphasizes the need for citizen supervision  of the representative's  deci-
sionmaking processes."1  Even if the model undervalues  the function  of
representation, it correctly focuses on the salutary effects of citizen delib-
eration.  If information is  kept secret, public deliberation cannot occur;
the risks of self-interested  representation  and factional tyranny  increase
dramatically.  The Jeffersonian  model  thus  calls  for substantial  limita-
tions on governmental  secrecy.
II
SECRECY  AND  DISCLOSURE
Even if it is agreed that citizens should generally be able to deliber-
ate  about government  action,  the need  for  secrecy  sometimes  justifies
government control of information.  This need may apply to many types
of information from  widely diverse sources.  Sometimes the information
has  been  privately  generated;  sometimes  it  comes  from  government
employees.  Sometimes it consists of information; sometimes it consists of
a point of view.  It will be useful to begin by identifying some of the types
of materials that government might seek to restrict.
One kind of information that government is interested in controlling
concerns  military  or diplomatic  secrets.  These include  both  proposed
courses of action-which, if disclosed, would no longer be effective-and
current  conduct  of which  an  adversary  is  unaware.  Examples  include
covert  operations  aimed  at  influencing  political  outcomes  in  foreign
countries,  including the bribery of foreign  officials.  Another category is
"technical  data":  scientific information with actual or potential military
applications.  This  information  may  come  either  from  the  government
itself or from  private  citizens.  Government  might  also  wish  to  keep
secret the contents of deliberations among public officials.
A  central  consideration  here  is  that  all  of this  speech  is  true-
indeed, that  is part of the definition of much of the "information"  that
government seeks to control.  Ordinarily in first amendment law, speech
is unprotected  either because it is false or because it serves not at all,  or
only tangentially, the underlying purposes of the first amendment.  Thus,
for example, false statements22 and obscenity23 are generally unprotected.
21.  See supra text accompanying  notes  11-13.
22.  See Gertz v. Robert  Welch,  Inc., 418  U.S.  323, 340  (1974).
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In the  examples  at  hand,  however,  government  is  seeking  to  suppress
speech precisely because it is true.  If technical data did not lead to mili-
tary or  scientific  progress,  or if information  about the status  of covert
operations  were false,  there would be less need to censor it.  Moreover,
most of this speech concerns  the operation  of the political  system  and
thus falls close to the heart of the Jeffersonian understanding.
In these circumstances, identification  of the reasons for suppression
is  an important step in evaluating  governmental  efforts to control infor-
mation.  The  reasons,  sometimes  invoked  in  the  cases,  fall  into  five
categories.
1.  Protecting military plans. Disclosure of military plans  or facts
will of course increase  vulnerability; if an adversary knows what  we are
doing, it will be harder for us to do it.  The same is true of disclosure of
"technical  data"  that  will  promote  the  military  capability  of  the
adversary.
2.  Facilitating negotiations.  Disclosure  may  inhibit  flexibility  in
bargaining during the process of decisionmaking.  If bargaining positions
are revealed to the public, views may harden, and the participants will be
less likely to arrive at a mutually acceptable accommodation. z4
3.  Facilitating  uninhibited  deliberations  within  government.
Secrecy  tends  to promote uninhibited  discussion  of policy options,  not
only in the negotiating process, but also during discussions with cowork-
ers  and superiors.  If decisionmaking  processes  were  exposed  to public
view,  disagreements  and controversial views might not be aired at all. 5
Similarly, a group is unlikely to develop a coherent position if it is unable
23.  Roth  v. United States, 354 U.S.  476,  484-85 (1957);  see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15,  20-21  (1973)  (quoting Roth).
24.  See S.  BOK,  SECRETS  184 (1982).  This justification  played a central  role in the framers'
decision  to ensure  secrecy in  the discussions that  led to the Constitution.  Among the first rules
adopted  at the Convention  was an injunction  against  publicizing the framers'  deliberations.  1 M.
FARRAND,  THE RECORDS  OF THE FEDERAL  CONVENTION  OF  1787,  17 (1911).  In Madison's view,
such secrecy was a necessary predicate to adoption of the Constitution.  He explained  that it was best
to sit with closed  doors, because opinions were so various and at first so crude that it was
necessary  they  should be  long debated  before  any uniform  system  of opinion  could  be
formed.  Meantime the minds of the members were changing, and much was to be gained
by a yielding and accommodating spirit.  Had the members committed  themselves publicly
at first, they would have afterwards  supposed consistency  required them to maintain their
ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any
longer than he  was  satisfied of their propriety  and  truth, and  was  open to the force  of
argument.
3 Id. at 479.  This rationale is tightly connected with Madison's conception of governance.  Accord-
ing to that conception,  representatives rather  than citizens at large were to engage  in deliberation.
See generally Sunstein,  supra note  7,  at 38-43  (discussing  departure of Madisonian  thought from
traditional  republicanism).  Characteristically,  Jefferson rejected this view.  See infra note 29.
25.  This  understanding  underlies  the principle  of executive  privilege.  See  United  States  v.
Nixon,  418 U.S. 683,  705 (1974).
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to explore, with some tentativeness, the disparate options with which it is
confronted.
4.  Avoiding interest-group  pressures. If deliberations  are disclosed
while they  are  in  progress,  organized  groups  with  intense  preferences
may  attempt  to  influence the outcome.  Interest-group  pressures  could
transform a deliberative process into an effort to trade off the interests of
powerful, well-organized  private groups.  Secrecy can prevent such pres-
sures  from  coalescing  and  serve  to  help  representatives  seek  a  public
good, based on what Madison  called the "force  of argument,"  which  is
distinct  from  the balancing  of  preexisting  interests.  For this  reason,
secrecy  may sometimes  alleviate  rather than  aggravate  the problem  of
factional  tyranny.26
5.  Avoiding distrust and suspicion; encouraging communications
from others. Disclosure, even of past conduct, may breed distrust among
allies and adversaries  alike and may  make people less willing to provide
confidential  information.  In  the  foreign  relations  context,  it  may  be
important to keep military projects secret.  We may be engaging in con-
duct that some  countries  disapprove,  even  though  the conduct  is  wel-
comed by others and is generally in the national interest; disclosure may
compromise  traditional  alliances  and the plans  themselves."  Domesti-
cally,  the Federal  Bureau  of Investigation  would be  less able  to attract
informants if it were unable to assure them that their identities, and per-
haps the contents of their communications, would be kept from the pub-
lic.  Privacy  interests  may  also  call  for  secrecy.  Examples  are  the
government's  refusal to disclose the records of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, the names of rape victims prior to the filing of a court action,2"  and
the confessions  of defendants  currently  on trial.
To outline the disadvantages  of disclosure is hardly to deny that in
some contexts  disclosure  will have significant  benefits  as well.  Like the
disadvantages, the benefits  fall into five categories.
1.  Citizen deliberation. Secrecy  prevents  the public  from making
decisions  after  deliberation.  In this respect,  it is  inconsistent  with the
principle of self-rule.29  Secrecy may thus undermine the central purposes
26.  Ironically, one of the purposes of a system of free expression is to ensure that governmental
decisions are the product of the force of argument rather than of a struggle of private interests; but in
some contexts, disclosure  will  work against  that same purpose.
27.  Henry  Kissinger  voiced  this  concern  in  disapproving  of Daniel  Ellsberg's  decision  to
release the Pentagon Papers.  "The  massive hemorrhage  of state  secrets was bound  to raise doubts
about our reliability in the minds of other governments, friend and foe, and indeed about the stability
of our political system."  H.  KISSINGER,  WHITE HousE YEARs  730  (1979).
28.  But  see  Cox  Broadcasting  Corp.  v.  Cohn,  420  U.S.  469  (1975)  (state  prohibition  of
publishing  rape victims'  names obtained from public  records unconstitutional).
29.  Jefferson,  invoking  this ground,  regretted  that by closing  the Constitutional  Convention,
the framers "began  their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up  the tongues
of their  members.  Nothing  can  justify  this  example  but the  innocence  of their  intentions,  and
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of the Jeffersonian  system:  preventing self-interested representation  and
the usurpation of government power by private factions.
2.  Checks and balances. Secrecy may distort the system of checks
and balances  in the structure of the federal  government.  It will be very
difficult, if not impossible, for the legislature to monitor the activities of
the executive branch if information is concentrated there.  This consider-
ation is especially important in light of the increasing power of the Presi-
dent in the field of foreign affairs.30  If Congress is to play a role, it must
have the relevant facts.  Although this rationale  may not justify disclo-
sure  to  the  public  at  large,  it  argues  against  executive  control  of
information.
3.  The deterrent effect of disclosure.  In some  circumstances,  dis-
closure of military  capabilities  will  actually  increase  national  security.
An adversary  who  is aware  of current  strengths  will  be less  likely to
undertake aggressive action.  Disclosure of certain pieces of information
may also facilitate technological advances.  An example is the suggestion
that the failure  to advertise  the  development  of radar was  detrimental
during World War 11.31
4.  Sunlight as a disinfectant.  If deliberations  are  conducted  in
secret, the participants may be less careful to ensure that their behavior is
unaffected  by  illegitimate  or  irrelevant  considerations.  Exposure  will
make it less likely that such considerations will influence public delibera-
tions.3z  In this sense,  disclosure can guard  against self-interested  repre-
sentation or the usurpation of government power by private groups.  To
say this, of course, is not to suggest that disclosure is a perfect safeguard;
impermissible motivations may merely be concealed.  But opening up the
process should weaken their influence.  The appearance of openness may
also promote popular trust in government.
5.  "Use value" and  progress. Information may improve social wel-
ignorance  of the value of public discussions."  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug.
30,  1787),  reprinted  in 1 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON  LETTERS  194,  196 (L. Cappon ed.  1959).
30.  See, eg., L. HENKIN,  FOREIGN AFFAIRS  AND  THE CONSTITUTION  (1972).
31.  In the case of radar, secrecy seriously delayed its development  ....  As a consequence,
although it was technically  and demonstrably  adequate to have done this relatively simple
job, radar failed to prevent Pearl  Harbor ....  Had  they known our radar protection  of
Pearl Harbor, there is at least a reasonable doubt that the Japanese would have attempted a
surprise.
In any event,  our shipping  losses  after  [the] beginning [of the war]  would  certainly
have been less than the tragic millions of tons.
Availability of Information  from Federal  Executive Agencies: Hearings  Before the Special Subcomm.
on Government Information of the House Comm. on  Government Operations, 84th Cong.,  2d Sess.
757 (1956)  (statement of L. Berkner); see also F. ROURKE,  SECRECY AND PUBLICITY  222-24 (1961)
(discussing this phenomenon).
32.  The  point  is  captured  in  Brandeis's  remark,  "Sunlight  is  said  to  be  the  best  of
disinfectants."  L. BRANDEIS,  OTHER  PEOPLE'S MONEY  62  (1933).
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fare; it is valuable  to those who use it; and it will tend to accelerate  tech-
nological  and  other  progress.  In  industry,  science,  and  elsewhere,
disclosure will enable people to accomplish tasks more quickly and eas-
ily, increase leisure time,  obtain greater profits,  and so forth.  Informa-
tion is in  this respect frequently  a valuable  commodity.  This  rationale
applies not only to speech about politics, but also to scientific, technologi-
cal,  and  other  information.  All  information  is  potentially  valuable,
whether or not it fits within the Jeffersonian  framework.
III
THE CURRENT  APPROACH  AND  ITS  SHORTCOMINGS
The problem of government control of information thus involves a
broad array of conflicting considerations.  If one were building the sys-
tem afresh,  one might approach the problem  by examining  which  inter-
ests are present in any particular case.  It would be possible, for example,
to create a basic presumption in favor of publicity, but to allow secrecy if
one or more of the various interests weigh heavily against it.  To be sure,
difficult problems would arise under such an approach.  Sometimes there
would be considerations on both sides; sometimes a particular argument
for  secrecy  or  disclosure  would  be  weak  in  context.  The  Jeffersonian
understanding  might help to simplify the inquiry, pointing as it does to
the primacy of political speech, broadly defined, and to the value of citi-
zen deliberation on issues of public importance.  But there would be hard
intermediate  cases,  and  serious questions  of judicial  competence  would
arise in balancing the relevant factors.  The hope would be that by pro-
ceeding  in  a  common  law  manner,  courts  could  eventually  generate
broad rules to cover most  cases.
Current  doctrine,  however,  has  generally  taken  a  quite  different
approach.  Rather  than assessing  the relevant  interests,  that approach
relies on the incentives  of the press and the government to generate  an
equilibrium that will, in a market-like fashion, operate to benefit the pub-
lic as a whole.  The model, set  out most crisply  by Alexander  Bickel,33
purports to describe the circumstances  in which  government's  desire for
secrecy  will  be  opposed  by  the  press's  interest  in  disclosure.  Bickel
begins by noting that, as far as the first amendment  is concerned,  "gov-
ernment is entitled to keep things private and will attain as much privacy
as it can get away with politically  by guarding its privacy internally."'34
This power "to arrange security at the source, looked at in itself, is great,
and  if  it  were  nowhere  countervailed  it  would  be  quite  frightening
..... -3  Bickel notes, however, the existence of a "countervailing power"
33.  See A.  BICKEL, supra note  6, at  79-83.
34.  Id. at 79.
35.  Id. at 80.
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which  allows  the  government  to  prevent the  press  from  publishing  a
story or pieces  of information  only in extreme  and  dire circumstances.
This situation, Bickel concedes, is  "disorderly,"  but it is preferable  to a
solution that would  sacrifice  either  privacy or public  discourse.  Bickel
concludes:
If we should let the government censor as well as withhold, that would be
too much dangerous power, and too much privacy.  If we should allow
the government  neither to censor nor to withhold, that would provide for
too little privacy  of decision-making  and too  much power  in the  press
36
We  might  describe this  approach  as an  equilibrium  theory  of the
first amendment.  The idea is that the government and the press operate
as  competing powers,  armed with different  incentives:  the government
seeks  to maintain  secrecy;  the press  seeks  disclosure.  This competition
ensures that if both  follow  their  self-interest,  the resulting  system will
work,  as if by an invisible hand, to benefit  the public  as a whole.  The
justification is similar  to that which underlies  the system of checks  and
balances in the structure  of the federal  government.37
Bickel's  system has  three clear  doctrinal components  that account
for almost all of current law with respect to government control of infor-
mation.  The  first  component  is  a  general  denial  of  "access"  rights.
There is no right of access to information that government has success-
fully withheld  from the public.  In  current law,  the right of access  to
judicial proceedings  is the only  exception3 8  to this  rule, and it is  quite
narrow.39  The second component is a general right to publish any infor-
mation that the press has acquired--even  if publication will  undermine
legitimate or indeed important governmental interests in secrecy.'  The
third component of the system is a grant of permission for government to
ban publication of information acquired by people in the private sector in
"extreme and dire circumstances."  Thus, for example, the minimal hold-
ing of the Pentagon  Papers case41 is that the government can restrain the
publication  of  information  if disclosure  "will  surely  result  in  direct,
immediate,  and irreparable  damage to our Nation  or its people."'42
36.  Id.
37.  See THE FEDERALIST No.  51  (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (government structured so that
each branch  has power to keep others  in their place).
38.  This right was established in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80
(1980).
39.  Note, however,  that the enactment  of the Freedom  of Information  Act,  5 U.S.C.  § 552
(1982  & Supp. 111984), may have relieved the pressure for recognition of other constitutional access
rights.
40.  See Landmark Communications,  Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.  829, 844-45  (1978).
41.  New York Times Co.  v. United States,  403  U.S.  713  (1971).
42.  Id. at  730  (Stewart, J.,  concurring).  The  standard  for  subsequent  punishment  may be
somewhat  lower,  but  it too  requires  a showing  of certain  and  immediate  harm.  See  Landmark
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The  important  question,  of  course,  is  whether  the  equilibrium
approach  to  the first  amendment  well  serves the Jeffersonian  model  of
free expression, or more precisely, whether it usefully accommodates the
need for secrecy as well as the interest in citizen deliberation.  Under one
view, the question is irrelevant:  the first amendment is about suppression
of speech, not about refusal  to disclose information. 3  It is  not possible
to  discuss this  argument in  detail  here.'  For  present purposes  it will
suffice to say that the constitutional text does not compel this conclusion,
and  that  if the result  depends  on  the  intentions  of the  Constitution's
drafters, it rests on controversial  premises  about constitutional  interpre-
tation.45  In other contexts-some involving the first amendment  itself-
the Court has departed from text and history at least as dramatically  as it
would  in  recognizing  a  right  of  access.4"  The  justification  for  these
departures is the conventional one:  the extension is necessary  in order to
promote the underlying  constitutional  value.47  Even if a  claim against
rights of access based on text and history is accepted on its own terms, it
is necessary  to decide  whether the equilibrium  theory attributed  to the
first amendment is likely to produce a sensible system of free expression,
or whether it sacrifices the need for secrecy, the interest in citizen deliber-
ation, or both.
One virtue of the theory is that the lines it draws  are for the most
part quite  well defined.  The  general  denial  of access  rights,  combined
with the general  denial  of power to  suppress materials  once  acquired,
minimizes  difficult  problems  of applying  first  amendment  law  in  this
area.  If courts recognized  rights of access in  some circumstances,  they
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)  (state ban on press reporting  of investigation
of judge unconstitutional);  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395  U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)  (advocacy of violence
constitutionally  protected except when  intended  to produce imminent lawless action).
43.  See, eg.,  BeVier, supra note 5, at 497-516 (Constitution does not establish right of access).
44.  There is ample writing on the subject.  See, e.g., Baker, Press  Rights and Government Power
to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI  L. REV.  819 (1980)  (arguing for and analyzing  implications of
independent interpretation  of press clause based on checking value  of media); BeVier, supra note 5
(arguing against  press right of access);  Lewis, A Public Right To Know About Public Institutions:
The First  Amendment as Sword, 1980 Sup. Cr. REV.  1, 22-24 (arguing for right of access to ensure
government accountability).
45.  See Brest,  The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.  204
(1980)  (exploring  various objections to "originalism");  Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,  56 N.Y.U.
L. REV.  469,  471-500 (1981)  (same).
46.  For example,  it is not clear  that the first amendment  was  intended  to extend  far  beyond
prior restraint,  see L.  LEVY,  EMERGENCE  OF A FREE PRESs  268-73  (1985),  and  it  is even  more
doubtful  that its  drafters  intended  it to aply  to commercial  speech,  libel  generally,  and sexually-
oriented  materials.
47.  Such approaches are of course vulnerable to attack.  See Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation
and the Power of the Judiciary,  7  HARV. J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y 87 (1984)  (arguing that judicial power
must be connected  to grants of authority).
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would face formidable questions of where to stop.48  A Pentagon Papers
standard makes most cases of prior restraint and subsequent punishment
quite simple-a considerable  improvement  over the open-ended  balanc-
ing that characterized first amendment  doctrine in earlier periods.49
But numerous other lines,  almost as clear, could be drawn.  A Pen-
tagon Papers standard might, for example,  be applied to all information
requested by private citizens; the Freedom of Information Act50 could be
a model  here.  The  government might be required  to justify nondisclo-
sure by reference to one or more of the arguments  set out above.  The
various considerations  arguing  for and against disclosure might eventu-
ally be developed into a series of bright-line rules,  as has happened  else-
where in first amendment law.51  And even if the equilibrium  approach
tends to generate  distinctly  administrable  rules, it should be rejected  if
those rules are independently  objectionable.
At the same  time, the theory  leaves  a number  of questions  unan-
swered.  One set of problems relates  to the relevance  of the methods by
which private citizens  obtain information.  Suppose, for example,  that a
citizen acquires information unlawfully.  Might government prohibit the
publication of information thus acquired?  Or suppose the information is
obtained, not through private illegality,  but through  the unlawful  con-
duct of a government  official.  Might  government  prevent  its  publica-
tion? 52  Does it matter whether  the private person  was aware or should
have been aware that the information was unlawfully acquired?
A second set of questions relates to the government's power to con-
trol the speech  of its employees.  Government  cannot be defined apart
from its agents.  Does the government's  power to "withhold"  extend to
the punishment of its own employees for breaches  of secrecy?  Are any
constitutional  questions raised by such sanctions?  Problems of this sort
suggest  that  the line  between  "withholding"  and  "censoring"  will  in
some contexts  be quite thin.
Questions of administrability  to one side, there is  no reason  in the
abstract to believe that the equilibrium approach well serves, or serves at
all,  the Jeffersonian  or any  other model  of freedom  of speech.  Specifi-
cally,  the equilibrium  theory  is  vulnerable  because  it does  not  address
three critical matters:  the actual incentives of the press and the govern-
48.  Cf  Brennan,  Address, 32  RUTGERS  L.  REv.  173,  177  (1979)  (protection  of press  in  its
performance  of all its tasks is theoretically  unlimited).
49.  See, e.g.,  Dennis v. United States,  341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951)  (test is whether gravity of evil
discounted  by probability of occurrence justifies  punishment of speech).
50.  5  U.S.C.  § 552  (1982  & Supp. H  1984).
51.  See J. ELY,  supra note  12,  at  108-16.
52.  The Pentagon Papers  case suggests a negative answer.  See New York Times Co. v. United
States,  403 U.S.  713 (1971).
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ment;  the respective  power of the countervailing  forces;  and  what the
proper baseline for evaluating  outcomes should be.
First, the equilibrium  approach is  premised on  a particular under-
standing of the relevant incentives,  in which government  seeks to main-
tain secrecy and the press  seeks disclosure;  but the incentives  are much
more complicated than the model suggests.  Neither the government nor
the press  is unitary.  Government  is an abstraction,  composed  of many
people.  Some  employees  will  not  single-mindedly  pursue  the  goal  of
secrecy.  Some will share interests with the press or seek to further their
own  careers  and  reputations.  As  a  principal,  "government"  is  able  to
exercise some control over its agents, but the officials who constitute gov-
ernment in this context themselves have complex incentives.  As always,
there  are  limits to the  amount  of control principals  can  exercise  over
their agents.
For its part, the press does not always  have as an overriding incen-
tive the revelation and disclosure  of government misconduct.  Alliances
often  develop  between the press and the government.  Most important,
the  principal  institutional  pressure  of  selling  the  product  makes  it
unlikely that the press will venture too far from what its consumers want
to read  or hear.  The press must appeal  to its own "constituency,"  and
costly  investigations  may  not  yield  financial  rewards.  It  is  therefore
unlikely that the press will always  seek to uncover government  miscon-
duct.  The system may thus fail to achieve an optimal level of disclosure.
To be  sure, neither  the  press  nor the constituency  of readers  and
listeners is unitary, and the resulting diversity of consumer interests will
increase the level and breadth of disclosure.  But the conclusion  that the
incentives  are  inadequate  is  most  powerful  with  respect  to  the  mass
media.  The mass media has the greatest influence,53  and it will attempt
to appeal to the wishes of mainstream consumers.
In general,  then,  the adversarial  model  on which  the equilibrium
theory relies is both odd and inaccurate.  It requires an assumption that
the government  and private  speakers  are  locked  in combat,  with each
trying constantly to undermine the other.  It would be disturbing if such
a picture  mirrored  reality.  The normal  expectations  are that the  press
will at least sometimes respect legitimate interests in secrecy, and that the
government  will often  promote disclosure  on  its own.  If the incentives
diverge  dramatically  from  what  the  equilibrium  model  assumes,  the
model  will break down.
Second,  the  equilibrium  theory  relies  on  an  assumption  that  the
countervailing forces  possess sufficient power to offset  one another, thus
53.  See, e.g.,  Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation  of Consent, 93 YALE  L.J.
581  (1984).
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providing an optimal level of disclosure.  That assumption lacks support.
In any  particular period,  government power to control disclosure  may,
for example, overwhelm the citizenry's interest in public discourse.  If so,
the model  will fail  to serve  the  goal  of ensuring  against  self-interested
representation.  Indeed,  the  notion  that  the  government  may  control
information  at its source  is at odds with the idea that the purpose of a
system  of free  expression  is to  control the conduct  of representatives.
54
On  the other hand, the power of the press to acquire information may
undermine  the need  for  secrecy,  especially  if government  is  unable to
control the behavior  of its agents.  The standard of justification for sup-
pressing  information  under the equilibrium  theory prevents  censorship
even  of dangerous  information.
Finally, it is always necessary with claims based on principles of the
invisible hand to have a baseline  from which to make an evaluation.  Is
the baseline one in which the public has all information unless the vari-
ous  interests  identified  above  require  secrecy?  How  does  one  know
whether  the  system  is  functioning  properly?  The  equilibrium  model
offers no way to answer such questions.
These problems  can be generalized  into  two  powerful  critiques  of
the equilibrium model.  The first would suggest that the equilibrium the-
ory  undervalues  the interest in  secrecy  in  a way that will  compromise
important government  interests.  The  system  permits  government  sup-
pression only in extraordinary circumstances.  That conclusion may well,
for example, foreclose  government  regulation  of the communication  of
technical data to foreign nations, notwithstanding  the potential  of such
communication  to  enhance  the  military  capability  of  perceived  and
actual enemies.  Furthermore, the system may prove inadequate to con-
trol "leaks"  by government officials,  at least if efforts at control are con-
sidered censorship rather than denial  of access.
The  second  critique  would  charge  that the  degree of government
control allowed by the equilibrium  theory undermines  the values of the
Jeffersonian  conception.  If, for  example,  government  is  authorized  to
keep  its  plans  and  processes  secret,  the  countervailing  power  of  the
press-in light  of its  complex incentives-may  be insufficient  to ensure
control and deliberation on the part of the citizenry.  To be sure, poten-
tial harm to national security or other important interests will sometimes
justify secrecy, but the equilibrium approach does not require the govern-
ment  to make  any such showing.  The ultimate risk  is that the equilib-
rium theory will fail to guard against self-interested  representation or the
usurpation of government power by private factions.
54.  See  infra  text  accompanying  notes  93-99  (discussing  systemic  impact  of  government
employee  waiver of free speech  rights).
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There is, in short, no reason to believe that the equilibrium model of
the first amendment will ensure a workable accommodation  of the inter-
ests  in disclosure  and  secrecy,  or that it  will promote  the Jeffersonian
conception  of free  expression.  Historical  experience  under the  equilib-
rium approach suggests that both critiques have been persuasive at differ-
ent  periods.  At times  the press  has been able  to  publish material  that
may have caused  considerable  harm; the Pentagon Papers case arguably
is  an  example."  On the other  hand, the experience  leading  up to  the
Freedom of Information Act produced evidence that government control
of  undisclosed  information  may  often  undermine  the  system  of  free
expression for no legitimate reason.
5 6
The equilibrium  theory remains impressionistic and relies  on prem-
ises  that  are  both  unsupported  and  unlikely.  The  sharp  distinction
between rights of access  and rights of publication thus rests on unstable
foundations.  To be sure, political forces may  produce partial  remedies,
of which the Freedom of Information Act is an example; but there is no
assurance that such remedies  will,  in conjunction  with  the equilibrium
theory, produce  a sensible  system of free expression.  All this suggests
that the distinction between access and publication is hard to defend and
that a system of interest-balancing,  informed by the Jeffersonian model,
would have important advantages.  But before exploring that issue, it will
be useful to examine the operation of the equilibrium model in particular
contexts.
IV
APPLICATIONS:  Two PROBLEMS  IN  FIRST AMENDMENT
THEORY
The discussion thus far has suggested that in the abstract,  the equi-
librium theory  is  highly vulnerable  to  attack.  This Part of the Article
examines the relationship between the equilibrium theory and two of the
more  controversial  contemporary  issues  in  first  amendment  doctrine.
Both  of these  issues  press  the  equilibrium  model,  though  in  different
ways.  The  first  involves  government  efforts  to  control  disclosure  of
"technical  data"  to  foreign  nationals;  the second  involves  the  govern-
ment's  power to  regulate the  speech  of its  own  employees.  Under the
equilibrium model, regulation of technical data appears to be prohibited
55.  See supra note  27.
56.  See generally  Availability of Information  from Federal  Executive Agencies:  Hearings  Before
the Special Subcomm. on Government Information of the House Comm. on  Government Operations,
84th  Cong.,  2d Sess.  to  86th Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1956-1959)  (exploring  problems  raised  by  extensive
government  secrecy); Freedom of Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm.  on Administrative
Practice  and Procedure  of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,  Ist Sess.  (1964)  (same);
Freedom of Information Act  and Amendments  of 1974:  Hearing Before the  House  Comin.  on
Goverment Operations,  94th  Cong.,  1st Sess.  236-37  (1975)  (statement of Rep. Matsunaga)  (same).
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censorship, for it involves the regulation of privately generated informa-
tion57 in circumstances in which it is generally impossible to demonstrate
grave harm.  Regulation of speech by government  employees  lies at the
boundary between government control of "its"  information and censor-
ship.  But it may be that this consideration, and the equilibrium model
generally,  point in precisely the wrong direction  on both issues.
A.  The Problem of Technical Data
A number  of statutes  regulate  the disclosure  of technical  data to
foreign nationals,  as part of a general effort to prevent foreign countries
from obtaining advanced  technology.  The most important  and contro-
versial of these statutes are the Arms Export Control Act,5" administered
by the Department  of State,59  and  the Export  Administration  Act  of
1979,60 administered  by the Department of Commerce.61
The Arms Export Control Act is  designed to regulate  the export of
items, consisting  of "defense  articles and defense  services,"62  placed  on
the  United  States  Munitions  List  compiled  by  the  State Department.
These items may not be exported without a license from the Department.
The Act would of course be ineffective  if it prohibited only the export of
actual arms.  The purpose of the statute is to ensure against disclosure of
technology.  Regulations thus  require a  license for export of "informa-
tion  which is  directly  related to"  the production, operation,  or mainte-
nance of enumerated armaments as well as "information which advances
the state of the art"  of such armaments.63  The term "export"  is defined
quite  broadly  to  include  disclosure  to  foreign  citizens  in  the  United
States, including students attending university lectures.64  Certain mate-
rial  is  exempted,  including  information  published  in journals  that  are
57.  The  relevant  regulations  apply  to  publicly  generated  information  as  well.  Such
applications  will not be discussed here-although, as suggested below,  one may doubt whether the
two  fall in different  categories for first amendment purposes.  See infra Part IV, Section B.
58.  Pub. L.  No. 90-629,  82  Stat.  1321  (codified as  amended  primarily at  22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-
2796(c)  (1982)).
59.  22 U.S.C.  § 2752(b) (1982).
60.  Pub. L. No. 96-72,  93  Stat. 503  (codified as amended primarily at 50 U.S.C.  §§ 2401-2420
(1982)).
61.  50  U.S.C.  § 2414  (1982).  Other  statutes  regulating  technical  data  are  discussed  in
Comment,  National Security  Controls on  the  Dissemination of Privately  Generated Scientific
Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 405  (1982).
62.  For definitions of these terms,  see 22 C.F.R. §§  120.7,  120.8  (1985).
63.  22 C.F.R.  §  120.21 (1985).  The Secretary of Defense  is separately authorized  to withhold
from  public  disclosure "any  technical  data  with military  or space application"  which  may not be
exported without a license under the act.  Technical data  are defined for these purposes to include
any information  that "can be used, or be adapted for use" in the design,  production, or maintenance
of military or space equipment.  10 U.S.C. §  140c (Supp.  11  1984).
64.  Such  regulations  have  a  severe  impact,  for  approximately  25%  of the  engineering  and
science graduate students in the United States are foreign nationals.  See Comment, supra  note 61,  at
426-27.
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available to the general public.65
Similarly, the Export Administration Act is designed to allow regu-
lation of the export of technological information that "could  make a sig-
nificant  contribution  to  the  military  potential  of  any  country  or
combination  of countries  which  would  be  detrimental  to  the  national
security of the United States."66  The provisions  of the Export Adminis-
tration Act are, for present purposes, similar to those of the Arms Export
Control Act.
The  constitutionality  of  these  restrictions  will  turn  largely  on
whether the information in question is entitled to "full"  first amendment
protection.  Under the equilibrium model, the harms invoked by govern-
ment  are  for  the  most  part  too  speculative  to  support  either  prior
restraint or subsequent punishment.  To be sure, disclosure  of technical
data will in some cases  aid the military efforts of other countries, but the
chain of causation  is too attenuated to justify prior  restraint under the
Pentagon  Papers standard.67
In particular, three  uncertainties  will generally  make  it impossible
for the government to meet the Pentagon Papers standard or to justify  a
ban under the equilibrium model even if the government's  burden were
less  severe.  First, with respect to most exports, it is uncertain  that the
information will be received by foreign governments at all.  Communica-
tion to foreign nationals-students or private companies-does not guar-
antee  communication  to  foreign  governments.  Second,  even  if  the
information  is  received,  it may  not  be put to  military  use.  The  other
country may have competing priorities.  It may be expensive to adapt the
information,  or  adaptation  may  require  information  that  the  country
lacks.  Finally, even if the information is received and put to military use,
it will be unlikely  to have  a  significant  effect on national  security  as  a
whole, even if it produces some incremental  harm.  In general, then, the
government's justification will not be sufficiently  powerful to support the
regulations  under current doctrine.68
65.  See  22  C.F.R.  §§  120.18,  125.1  (1985).  The  statute  and regulations  do  not require  any
particular  state  of mind  on  the part  of  the  exporter,  though  a  court  of appeals  has  implied  a
requirement that  the exporter  know  or have  reason  to know  that  the recipient  intends  to use  the
exported  information  to make  or operate  articles  on  the  Munitions  List.  United  States  v.  Edler
Industries, Inc.,  579  F.2d 516,  521  (9th Cir.  1978).
66.  50 U.S.C. app.  § 2401(8)  (1982).
67.  It will be remembered  that under  that standard,  government must show  that  "disclosure
...  will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable  damage to our Nation or its people."  New
York Times  Co. v.  United  States, 403 U.S.  713, 730  (1971)  (Stewart,  J., concurring).
68.  Nor  is technical  data  unprotected because  its recipients  are foreign  nationals.  It may  be
that there is no right to receive information from foreigners, see Kleindienst  v. Mandel, 408  U.S. 753,
770 (1972),  or that  foreigners  themselves have  no first  amendment  rights while  residing outside of
the  country.  The  government  is  not  permitted,  however,  to  prevent  American  citizens  from
communicating  with  citizens of foreign countries.
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The critical question then becomes whether scientific  information is
entitled  to  full  first  amendment protection-a  question  that the Court
itself asks  in analyzing  free speech  cases,69 but which is foreign to the
equilibrium  approach.  At first glance,  the argument for affording such
protection  seems  quite powerful.  First, technical information  might  in
some  contexts  have  a significant  bearing  on public  deliberation.  Con-
sider,  for  example,  the  relevance  of such  information  to  debates  over
nuclear  weapons,  the control  of carcinogenic  substances,  or the use  of
nuclear  energy.70  Often  it  is  difficult  to take  responsible  positions  on
such issues without having command of technical matters. 7 1
Scientific information is also part of a genuine marketplace of ideas,
one in which there is some sort of progress.72  Thus it has been remarked
that the
significant new concepts of science are often..,  the result of association
of widely  diverse facts  and  ideas that  may  not  hitherto  have  seemed
remotely  connected.
Such ideas as the law  of mechanics  ...  together with the work of
Planck  on  high  temperature  radiation,  led  Einstein  to  postulate  the
equivalence of mass and energy....
69.  This mode of analysis is quite clear in the commercial  speech context.  See, eg., Virginia
State Bd.  of Pharmacy  v. Virginia  Citizens  Consumer Council,  Inc.,  425  U.S.  748,  758-70 (1976).
For  an  analysis  arguing  that  scientific  speech  should  be  afforded  constitutional  protection,  see
Ferguson,  Scientific and Technological Expression: A  Problem in  First Amendment  Theory,  16
HARV.  C.R.-.C.L.  L.  REv.  519  (1981)  (scientific  speech  entitled  to first  amendment  protection
according  to values  underlying  commercial  speech decisions);  Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the
First  Amendment,  64  CORNELL  L. REv.  639  (1979)  (Court  has  hinted  that  scientific speech  is
protected  under  first amendment,  and  such  protection  is  proper);  Redish,  Limits on  Scientific
Expression and the  Scope of First  Amendment Analysis:  A  Comment on Professor  Kamenshine's
Analysis, 26 WM.  & MARY L. REV. 897 (1985)  (arguing against  "low-value"  approach to  scientific
speech).
70.  Consider in this regard Robert Dahl's suggestion  that "the institutionalization  of secrecy
has concentrated,  in the hands of a few people, control  over decisions of a great magnitude for the
values of a larger number of persons than in all probability were ever affected by any old-fashioned
authoritarian  leader."  Dahl, Atomic Energy and the Democratic  Process, in The Impact of Atomic
Energy, 290 ANNALS  1, 2-3 (1953).
71.  United  States  v.  Progressive,  Inc.,  467  F. Supp.  990  (W.D.  Wis.),  request for writ of
mandamus denied sub nom.  Morland  v. Sprecher,  443 U.S.  709, dismissed, 610 F.2d 819  (7th Cir.
1979), is relevant here.  In that case, information on how to make a hydrogen bomb was offered as an
integral  part of an  argument  explaining  the nature  of the crisis  produced  by  the availability  of
nuclear weapons.  In such a case, it would be hard to argue that the government's burden is reduced
because  scientific information  is "nonpolitical."
72.  Consider Oppenheimer's  view:
If you are a scientist you believe  that it is good to find out how the world works; that it is
good to find  out what the realities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the
greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its lights and
its values.
Oppenheimer rejects any "attempt to treat science of the future as though it were rather a dangerous
thing,  a thing  that  must be watched  and managed."  Address  by J. Robert  Oppenheimer  to the
Association  of Los Alamos  Scientists  (November  2,  1945),  reprinted in  ROBERT  OPPENHEIMER:
LETTERS AND  RECOLLECTIONS  317-18 (A. Smith & C. Weiner  eds.  1980).
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Yet today, any intelligent military organization,  operating under the
present security rules, would certainly classify  the equivalent of Planck's
work so that it would be denied  to a potential Einstein.73
Communication  of scientific  information,  including technical  data,  is a
crucial mechanism by which science progresses.  In this respect, scientific
information stands far afield from obscenity, the classic example of "low
value"  speech.74
Technical data will, then, sometimes be part of political speech, and
it will contribute to scientific development.  Under a Jeffersonian concep-
tion of the first amendment, however,  large categories  of technical data
are, in  context,  far from the center  of first amendment  concern.  Such
data may  consist of algorithms, equations,  charts, or blueprints.  Infor-
mation of that sort is communicative, to be sure; it involves ideas,  and it
is  "speech."  But that speech  is not necessarily of the sort to which the
Jeffersonian model affords full protection."
Whether  and when  speech  should  be  considered  "low  value"  is  a
complex question, but it is possible to isolate a series of factors that both
account  for the  cases  and  are  congenial  to  the Jeffersonian  approach.
First,  speech  that  concerns  political  processes,  broadly  construed,  is
treated differently from speech that has little or nothing to do with public
affairs.7 6  Second, the purpose of the speaker is relevant:  if the speaker is
seeking to communicate a political messsage, again broadly construed, he
will be treated more favorably than if he is not.  Third, the categories  of
low-value speech tend to represent categorical judgments  that in certain
areas, government is unlikely to be acting for constitutionally impermis-
sible reasons or to be producing constitutionally impermissible harms.  In
the cases of commercial speech, private libel, and obscenity, for example,
one might say that government regulation is peculiarly likely to be based
73.  Hearings,  supra note 31,  at 756  (statement of L. Berkner).
74.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.  15  (1973);  Roth  v. United States,  354 U.S.  476  (1957).
75.  One  might  reach  this  conclusion  without  defining  the  notion  of  "political  speech"
narrowly, as does Judge Bork.  See Bork, supra note 7, at 27-28 (protected speech should  not include
scientific, educational, commercial,  or literary expressions).  In particular, much literature should be
placed in the category of "political"  speech.  Meiklejohn believed that literature is a basic part of the
"many forms of thought and expression within the range of human  communications from which the
voter  derives the knowledge,  intelligence,  sensitivity to  human  values:  the  capacity  for  sane and
objective  judgment  which,  so  far  as  possible,  a  ballot  should  express."  Meiklejohn,  The  First
Amendment Is An Absolute,  1961  Sup.  Cr.  REv.  245,  256.  The  basic  understanding  is correct,
though  the limitation  to "ballot"  and  "voting"  unduly  restricts  the  operation  of the Jeffersonian
model, which offers a broader scope for citizen participation.  Under this view, too, scientific speech
will often be protected  when it is part of the deliberative process.  Cf id. at 257 (listing categories of
thought and  expression deserving of first amendment  protection).
In any event  the government's justifications for banning literary  speech  tend  to be very  weak.
Some technical  data stands at the opposite pole in terms of its centrality  to the Jeffersonian model
and  the strength of the government  interests supporting  regulation.
76.  See supra notes  15-18 and accompanying  text.
[Vol.  74:889GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF INFORMATION
on  legitimate reasons,  and  peculiarly  unlikely  to be  a product  of self-
interested representation  or factional  tyranny.  Judicial  scrutiny  is thus
more deferential.
Under all three inquiries, technical data will often qualify as speech
entitled to  less than the highest level  of protection.  At least generally,
the release of such data to foreign nationals does not, and is not intended
to,  communicate  a  substantive  political  message.  Regulation  is  not
designed to insulate government from criticism or to promote the welfare
of self-interested private groups.  The context and purpose of the disclo-
sure of technical data will thus often justify the conclusion that such data
may be regulated on the basis of a somewhat less powerful demonstration
of harms.
These  themes,  borrowed  from the Jeffersonian  understanding,  are
conventional in first amendment law, though they are foreign to the equi-
librium  model as set out by Bickel.  Obscenity, false statements of fact,
fighting words, and private libel are thus analyzed differently from other
forms of speech.  But the notion that some speech should be afforded less
protection  because of its  "low value"  is  highly controversial.  The very
assessment of value might be thought to call for inquiries that are incom-
patible with a sensible system of free expression.  Such inquiries will also
produce  hard  problems  of  line-drawing,  which  should  generally  be
avoided in first amendment doctrine lest the censor draw the line at the
point that best promotes the censor's own interests.  Moreover, an assess-
ment of value requires a judgment about the central purposes of the first
amendment.  But it is  by no  means  universally  accepted  that the  first
amendment protects only or especially political speech, even if "political
speech"  is very broadly defined.
It is not my purpose here to enter the longstanding  debate over the
purposes of the first amendment.  But it would be hard to develop a sys-
tem of free  expression  that did not  distinguish  categories  of speech  in
accordance with their centrality to the purposes  of the free speech guar-
antee.  A system that failed to draw such lines would likely be driven to
deny full protection to speech that merits it.  The burden of justification
on government  would be weakened  in order to  allow  regulation  of (for
example) commercial speech, and that weaker burden would by hypothe-
sis have to extend across the board.  The alternative would be to adopt a
justification requirement  so stringent  as to forbid regulation  that is cur-
rently accepted,  on the theory  that the burden applied  to regulation  of
political speech should be extended to (for example) commercial  speech.
In these circumstances  the most likely outcome is that judgments about
value would be made tacitly and that the articulated  rationale for deci-
sions  would not reflect an assessment  of all of the factors thought rele-
vant by the Court.
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Once  distinctions  are  admitted  among  categories  of speech,  the
question  becomes  on  what those  distinctions  will  be  based.  It  will be
sufficient to suggest that the Jeffersonian  model, in its emphasis  on polit-
ical speech, has history on its side;"  that it is responsive,  as other theo-
ries  are  not,  to the  contexts  in  which government  is likely  to  be  least
trustworthy  as an  arbiter; 78  and that it may well  point to what  is most
distinctive  about speech as a human activity.79
If the emphasis on political speech is accepted,  at least some catego-
ries of technical data will be near the periphery  of first amendment  con-
cern.  In this context, any solution is imperfect,  and perhaps the best way
to make the argument is to point out the weaknesses of the alternative.  If
technical  data is to be treated the same as political speech,  the  govern-
ment will face a heavy burden of justification for suppressing  the infor-
mation.  But an approach that would require the same showing  of harm
to ban both political speech and mathematical  equations  is likely to lead
to serious anomalies.  On the one hand, a conclusion that export of tech-
nical data can be banned would  require a considerable  loosening of the
Pentagon Papers standard.  The relaxation  of the standard  would  mean
that a lesser showing of harm would be required to ban political speech, a
result that is  inconsistent  with the course  of first  amendment  doctrine
since World  War II.80
On  the other  hand,  a  conclusion  that  technical  data  may  not be
restricted  because  government  is  unable  to  meet  the Pentagon Papers
standard  will have broad implications.  The regulations  in question  are
directed at export not only of technical data, but also of the underlying
products-items  on the munitions list and other material that is adapta-
ble  to military  use.  The  reason for  the  prohibition  of export  of these
products  is precisely their "communicative  impact."  The government's
fear is that if the materials are exported, they might be reproduced.  The
technical  data and the products stand on the same footing.
This conclusion suggests that under normal first amendment princi-
ples, the prohibition of the export of the materials is constitutionally  sus-
pect.  Regulations  of  conduct  that  are  aimed  at  its  communicative
content are properly treated as regulations of speech.81  If this is correct,
77.  See generally L. LEVY, supra note 46.
78.  See  F. SCHAUER,  supra note 7.
79.  1 J.  HABERMAS,  THE THEORY  OF  COMMUNICATIVE  ACTION  99-101,  286-88,  306-08
(McCarthy trans.  1984); Pitkin, supra note  8, at  342-46.
80.  See J. ELY,  supra note  12, at  105-16 for a  review of such doctrine and for an argument  in
favor of protecting  all  speech  except that falling  in a  few specified,  narrow categories.
81.  See  United  States  v.  O'Brien,  391  U.S.  367  (1968).  To  be  sure,  there  may be  no  first
amendment  issue if the only  communicative  impact  is aimed  at  people  in  another  country.  Cf
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753  (1972)  (denial of visa to Marxist journalist does not violate  first
amendment rights of potential  American  listeners).  But the provisions  governing export of both the
arms and the data  extend to communicative  impact within  the United  States.
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the government must justify the prohibition of exporting not only techni-
cal  data but also items  on the munitions list by meeting  the Pentagon
Papers standard.  As already  noted, that standard cannot be satisfied.82
It  would  be  unfortunate  indeed  if it  became  necessary  to  revive  the
largely  discredited  distinction between  speech  and  conduct  in  order to
permit the government to regulate exports of items on the munitions list.
To say that some technical data may be regulated on the basis of a
less  powerful justification  is hardly to  say that scientific  information  is
deprived  of first amendment  protection.  In many  cases,  such informa-
tion will be of central first amendment  concern.  Examples are scientific
information  about  the  risks  of nuclear  power,  the  status  of national
defense,  or the incidence  of cancer produced by various  environmental
hazards.  To be  sure,  there  will be  difficult  intermediate  cases  for the
courts-as there are under current doctrine-but here as elsewhere, the
existence of such cases is not a sufficient reason to abandon an otherwise
sensible  distinction.  The  basic  question  is  whether  technical  data  are
being released  as  part  of a political  communication,  and  in almost  all
cases  that  will  arise  in  the  real  world,  that  question  will  be  easily
answered.
Moreover, the conclusion that some technical data may be banned
on a  lesser  showing  of harm does  not imply that the  government  has
license  to ban  scientific  information  whenever  it chooses.  It must still
meet  a considerable  burden,  as  the commercial speech  cases  suggest.83
But  if  the  technical  data  do  not  implicate  concerns  central  to  the
Jeffersonian  model,  that burden  should  be substantially  lower than the
Pentagon Papers standard.  Thus,  for  example,  government  should  be
able to regulate the export of technical data when it is able to show that
the export is likely to bring to an adversary's  attention information that
has probable military application and that will substantially enhance the
adversary's military position.  This standard is more deferential than that
in Pentagon Papers, but it still imposes a  significant burden on govern-
ment.  The standard will,  of course, leave  difficult cases  in application;
the point is not to suggest how each case should be decided but instead to
explain  why the burden  on government should be more lenient.
These considerations suggest that some categories of technical data
may be regulated consistently with the first amendment,  even if the data
have been generated  privately.  This conclusion  leads to a more  general
82.  See supra text accompanying  notes 67-68.
83.  See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia  Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748  (1976)  (commercial  speech  entitled  to  first  amendment  protection).  But see Posadas  de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,  106  S.  Ct. 2968 (1986)  (legislative power to
ban casino  gambling  entirely  "necessarily  includes  the  lesser  power  to  ban  advertising  of casino
gambling").
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point.  A  significant  defect in the  equilibrium  model is  that it does  not
incorporate  the  notion that there  should  be gradations  in  the  govern-
ment's burden of justification,  gradations  that depend  on the  nature  of
the speech sought to be regulated.
B.  Government Employees
The problem  of controlling  speech  by government  employees  has
received  considerable  attention in recent  years, especially  in connection
with the increased use of "secrecy agreements."  The Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  and some offices within the
Department of Defense currently provide that past and present  employ-
ees  may not publish material  deriving  from  their employment  without
prior government authorization. 4  In 1983 President Reagan issued, and
later withdrew, a set of regulations that would have required hundreds of
thousands of federal employees having access to classified information to
sign prepublication  review  agreements.
8 5
The  problems  raised  by speech  by  government  employees  span  a
wide range, including subversive advocacy,  criticism of the government,
and,  most  important  for  present  purposes,  disclosure  of information
acquired  during  government  employment.  The  remedies  that govern-
ment  might  seek  are  also  quite  varied.  Among  the possibilities  are  a
blanket  prohibition,  a  requirement  of  prepublication  review
("preclearance"),  restrictions on political activity, criminal  penalties, dis-
charge, civil fines, and restitution of any profits gained from the speech in
question.  These restrictions might be applied to  current or former gov-
ernment employees.
The current attempts to control the speech of government  employ-
ees  do  not fit comfortably  into the equilibrium  model.  If an employee
decides to breach a secrecy agreement or to divulge information  acquired
in confidence,  one might conclude  that the government  has  failed in its
efforts to preserve secrecy, and that the information cannot be suppressed
except  in a  dire  emergency.  On the other  hand,  government  does  not
exist apart from its agents, and if its methods of controlling its employees
84.  See  Prepublication  Review and Secrecy Requirements Imposed Upon Federal  Employees:
Hearings  Before  the  Subcomm.  on  Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.  on  the
Judiciary,  96th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1980).  Thus, for example, CIA employees must agree to submit for
prior review
all  writings  and  scripts  or  outlines  of  oral  presentations  intended  for  nonofficial
publication,  including  works  of fiction,  which  make  any mention  of intelligence  data or
activities, or contain data which may be based upon information  classified pursuant to law
or Executive order....  No steps will be taken toward publication  until written  permission
to do so is received  ....
Id. at 24 (statement  of Alice Daniel)  (footnote omitted).
85.  National  Security Directive No.  48  (March  11,  1983),  reprinted  in  5 A.B.A.  STANDING
COMM.  ON  LAW  AND  NAT'L  SECURITY  INTELLIGENCE REP.  1 (1983).
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are only hortatory, the equilibrium  model may break down.  If the gov-
ernment were permitted  to obtain a prepublication review  agreement,  a
legal remedy for its violation might be treated as a permissible means of
denying nongovernmental  persons or entities access to the government's
information.  In  this respect,  a legal  remedy  could  be understood  as  a
mechanism by which government  keeps its information private.  In  any
event,  as  we  shall  see,  the  awkward  place  of  speech  by  government
employees  in the equilibrium  model accounts for much of the doctrinal
confusion.
Here, as in the case of technical data, there are few decisions on the
subject.  The equilibrium model, embodied in the notion that government
may control "its"  information, played  an important role in the leading
case  on  the  point, Snepp  v.  United States. 86  In that  case,  the  Court
upheld  a  CIA  agreement  that  prohibited  Snepp  from publishing  any
information, whether or not classified, about the CIA without obtaining
clearance from the government.  According to the Court, the agreement
was  a  "reasonable  means"  of protecting  "the  secrecy  of information
important to our national  security and the appearance of confidentiality
so  essential  to  the  effective  operation  of  our  foreign  intelligence
service.  "87
The decision in Snepp, however, was a narrow one.  It involved the
CIA,  and the government has a powerful  interest in controlling speech
by CIA employees  in light of their access  to information  whose disclo-
sure  could  produce severe  harms of the sort catalogued  above.  More-
over, the remedy in question was not an outright ban.  It involved instead
preclearance,  following  which publication might well have been permit-
ted,  and  a  constructive  trust for profits  gained  through breach  of the
agreement. 88
As Snepp reveals, the central question  raised by restrictions  on the
speech  of government  employees  involves  the  government's  burden  of
justification.  Here, as in the case of technical data, the government  will
almost  always89  be unable to meet the Pentagon Papers standard.  The
information in question rarely would produce certain grave harm.  More-
over, if the government attempted to regulate the speech of private citi-
zens  as  much  as  it  does  that  of  its  employees,  the  regulation  would
certainly  be unconstitutional.  The  question then becomes  why the bur-
den of justification should be lowered simply as a result of the speaker's
status as a past or present government employee.  Notably, it will usually
86.  444 U.S. 507  (1980).
87.  Id. at 509  n.3.
88.  Id. at 510-16.
89.  In some circumstances, of course, an employee may attempt  to disclose  information that is
vital to national  security, but these  cases will be  rare.
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be impossible to argue that the speech in question is low value.  Disclo-
sures by government employees will usually be central to the Jeffersonian
conception, for they will relate directly to the operations of government.
Arguments for restricting the speech of government  employees tend
to  involve  three  separate  claims:  that  employees  have  waived  their
rights;  that government  "owns"  certain  information;  and that  govern-
ment  has  distinct  interests  as  an  employer  that justify  regulation.  Of
these justifications, only the third relates to the justifications for  regula-
tion discussed in Part III above;  and none is sufficient to justify the cur-
rent restrictions  on employee  speech.
L  The Argument from  Waiver
Under this approach, the issue is a simple one.  At least where there
is an explicit agreement,  and perhaps where there is a regulation on the
point,  government  employees  voluntarily  relinquish  their rights  of free
speech.  Snepp, for example, had signed an agreement to submit his writ-
ings to prepublication review.  In  general,  constitutional  rights may  be
waived,90  and  the same  conclusion  should  be appropriate  here.9 1  The
claim is closely  related  to the  equilibrium  approach;  it derives  from  an
understanding  that government may control information  within its own
hands.
The argument from waiver is exceptionally broad.  It would permit
the government to condition employment on whatever terms it sees fit,  as
long as it can obtain an agreement from the employee.  But the Court has
generally rejected the distinction between rights and privileges  in consti-
tutional law.92  The usual reason is that conditions imposed on privileges
permit the government to do indirectly what it may  not do directly  and
exert  impermissible  "pressure"  on  constitutional  rights.  Under  this
approach, the issue is not whether the employee is better off as a result of
the employment  contract,  but whether  the  right is  pressured  in  a way
that it would not be if government had not imposed the condition.  When
government makes  preclearance of writings  a condition of employment,
the right to freedom  of speech is curtailed,  even if the employee  accepts
the agreement.
This point suggests that even voluntary waivers interfere with rights
90.  See, e.g.,  Johnson v.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458  (1938)  (waiver  of right  to  counsel).
91.  See Easterbrook, Insider Trading,  Secret Agents, Evidentiary  Privileges, and the Production
of Information, 1981  Sup.  Cr.  REV.  309,  344-52  (arguing that  contract  in  Snepp involved  valid
waiver of first amendment  rights).
92.  See  Van Alstyne,  The Demise of the Right-Privilege  Distinction in Constitutional  Law, 81
HARV.  L. REV.  1439  (1968)  (arguing that  implications of distinction between  rights and privileges
has  been  gradually  eroded).  But cf  Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The  Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive  State, 132  U. PA. L. REV.  1293,  1308  n.43 (1984)  (distinction between rights and
privileges has continued  vitality).
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of free speech, but it does not explain why these interferences  should be
proscribed when the employee  is willing to  acquiesce.  The  explanation
lies in the systemic or structural consequences  of government purchases
of first amendment  rights, consequences that the argument  from waiver
ignores.93  As we have  seen, the first amendment is largely a structural
provision, -guarding against self-interested  representation and the control
of government by powerful private groups.94  Its purpose  is not only to
protect private autonomy, but also to preserve a certain form of govern-
ment.  Citizens may often find it in their interest to give up rights of free
speech in exchange for benefits from government.  For many, these rights
are not extremely  valuable as individual possessions.  But if government
is permitted  to  obtain enforceable  waivers, the aggregate  effect  may be
considerable, and the deliberative processes of the public will be skewed.
Self-interested  representatives will be more able to entrench  themselves,
and private groups will be subject to less control.  Waivers of first amend-
ment  rights  thus  affect  people  other  than  government  employees,  and
effects  on third parties are a classic reason to proscribe waivers.
The  analogy  here  is  to government  purchases  of voting  rights,95
which  are impermissible  even if voters willingly assent.  To be sure, the
systemic effects might be small in light of the large number of employers
other  than the  government.9 6  But the breadth of government  activity
suggests  that the impact  is unlikely to be minimal, even if government
does not have "market power" in the sense of antitrust law.  Moreover, it
may well be that government skewing of deliberative  processes is imper-
missible  even if the extent of the effect is unclear.97
This  argument implies  that like the right to vote, the right  to free
speech  is not  alienable.9 8  There is  a  social  interest in ensuring  against
government purchases of decisionmaking processes, even if employees, in
their capacity as employees, are better off as a result.  To be sure, market
pressures  may  act  to  some  degree  as  a safeguard  against  government
efforts to purchase employee speech; employees will demand some sort of
93.  See  Kreimer, supra note 92, at  1391; cf R. DWORKIN,  A MATTER  OF PRINCIPLE 395-97
(1985)  (emphasizing  rights of listeners as basis for rejecting  waiver arguments).
94.  See supra text accompanying  notes 9-13.
95.  See Epstein,  Why  Restrain Alienation?,  85  COLUM.  L. REv.  970, 984-88  (1985).
96.  Cf  Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 347 (arguing large number of employers  gives employee
choice of job packages, and employee choosing package waiving first amendment rights shows belief
that package is advantageous).
97.  Cf  M. WALZER,  SPHERES  OF JUSTICE  100-03  (1983)  (discussing rights that should not be
traded  through markets).
98.  See R. DWORKIN,  supra note  93,  at 395-97  (pointing to rights of listeners  and justifying
inability to waive rights of equality).  Rights in the criminal justice system, by contrast, generally do
not  raise  systemic issues;  they are  best understood  as  individual  rights rather  than separation  of
powers provisions.  The issue then becomes  whether some individual rights are not waivable despite
the absence of systemic effects.  See id.; Kreimer, supra note 92.
1986]CALIFORNIA  LAW  REVIEW
fee  for the relinquishment  of first  amendment  rights.  But  there  is  no
reason to believe that the amount that employees will demand is enough
to  guard  against  substantial  infringements  on  the  system  of  free
expression.
These considerations  raise a more general point.  To a large  extent
the Constitution,  including the first amendment, operates  as a constraint
on the reasons for government action.99  In some contexts the only inter-
est supporting a secrecy agreement  will be the desire  to immunize  gov-
ernment from  criticism or exposure.  If in suppressing employee  speech
government is acting for a reason that is constitutionally proscribed, it is
irrelevant that the employee  may have acquiesced.  And even if a legiti-
mate interest might be identified,  it will be outweighed  by the systemic
consequences  of government purchases  of first amendment  rights.  Thus
far, then, government  employees  should be treated the same as  citizens
generally.  All this is to suggest that in the context of restrictions on the
speech  of  government  employees,  arguments  from  waiver  are
unpersuasive.
2.  The Argument from Ownership:  The  "Government's" Information
A second argument for permitting broad  restrictions  on speech by
government  employees  can  be  derived  directly  from  the  equilibrium
model.  By  hypothesis,  the  employee  has  received  information  solely
because  of  government  employment.  It  is  proper  for  government  to
structure its relations with its agents so as to prevent disclosure of infor-
mation  to  which  neither  they  nor  members  of the  public  have  an
antecedent  right.  Permitting government  to  retain  its information  is a
reasonable  accommodation  of the interests in disclosure  and secrecy.
This claim is narrower than the argument from waiver, for it would
not permit a prohibition on publication of materials that do not include
information  obtained  during  employment  with  the  government.  The
class of permissible prohibitions is therefore smaller.  The argument does,
however, permit  some form  of preclearance in order to ensure  that the
government's  information is not included in the employee's writings.
This argument relies on property-based  notions of information own-
ership, notions that treat the government like a private citizen who owns
information.  But  the government  is  an  abstraction.  It  need  not  have
rights  in  information  akin  to  those  of  a  private  citizen.  Whether  it
should be permitted  to prevent  the relevant  information  from reaching
the public, if a past or present employee  wants to disclose it, should not
depend  on labels having to do with "ownership."  The precedents  here
99.  See Stone,  Content Regulation and the First  Amendment, 25 WM.  & MARY L. REIV.  189,
227-30  (1983);  Kreimer, supra note  92, at  1312.
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are the public forum cases,  which have also created a right of access.'"0
These decisions turn on the understanding that government ownership of
property does not necessarily dispose of a first amendment  claim.  Gov-
ernment must justify restrictions  by reference  to something  other than
ownership. 0 1
In  order  to  assess  the  argument  from  ownership,  it  is  useful  to
explore  the analogy  to  private  law.  Corporations  and  individuals  are
entitled to obtain damages for disclosure of information in breach of con-
tract;0 1 z why should  government be treated differently?  The answer lies
in the reasons for permitting secrecy in the two cases.  For a private cor-
poration,  information  is  an  asset like  any  other  form  of property.  Its
value rests largely in its unavailability to competitors, and disclosure  in
violation  of contract  is  a  form of theft,  enabling  those  competitors to
profit.  Information is therefore protected for some of the same reasons
that justify protection of private property in general.
Information  in  the  hands  of the  government,  however,  is  not  an
asset whose  "value"  lies in its unavailability to competitors.  The public
is  hardly  the  government's  "competitor,"  but  is  instead  its  ultimate
source of authority.  0 3  In addition, the information that a private corpo-
ration seeks to suppress is usually far from the center of first amendment
concern;  it will involve trade secrets,  competitive strategies, or claims of
mismanagement.  Speech by government  employees, by contrast,  is gen-
erally near the heart of the Jeffersonian  model."°
Similar considerations  distinguish  contracts  between  individuals to
guard against disclosure of private information.  In such cases, the notion
of private  ownership  is  plausible,  and  the  first  amendment  interest  is
weak.  When government tries to enforce a secrecy agreement,  however,
the opposite is true:  the speech often concerns public affairs and notions
of "ownership"  are  implausible.  The  analogy  to  private  ownership  of
information thus breaks down because the arguments  that support such
ownership are inapplicable to government.
The first amendment question should therefore turn not on notions
of information  ownership, but on what sort of justification  the govern-
100.  See  Grayned  v.  City of Rockford, 408  U.S.  104,  115  (1972)  ("The right to use a public
place  for  expressive  activity  may be  restricted  only  for  weighty  reasons");  see  also Stone, Fora
Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup.  Cr. REv.  233,  255;  Note,  The First  Amendment
Right To Gather State-Held Information, 89 YALE  L.J. 923,  934-36  (1980).
101.  See Grayned, 408 U.S. at  119  (prosecution under antinoise  ordinance  is constitutional  as
ordinance furthers government interest in undisrupted school day); Stone, supra note 100, at 251-52,
254; Note, supra note  100, at 934-36.
102.  See Zoecon Industries  v. American  Stockman Tag Co., 713  F.2d  1174 (5th Cir.  1983).
103.  To  be  sure,  corporations  may be able  to suppress the  disclosure  of information  to their
shareholders, who stand in a position in relation to the corporation that is in some respects akin to
that of the people  in relation to  their government.  But even here, the interests are quite  different.
104.  See R. DWORKIN,  supra note 93,  at 395-96.
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ment is able  to use to support the restriction.  This  argument  of course
amounts  to  a  fundamental  attack  on  the  equilibrium  theory,  which
depends  on  the  notion  that  some  information  should  be  treated  as
belonging to the  government.
Even  if notions  of ownership  are accepted,  a  preclearance  mecha-
nism  is  often  too  broad  to  accomplish  the  government's  permissible
goals.  It is one thing to say that preclearance  is required for speech that
may contain classified information and that is produced by a former offi-
cial of the CIA.  In their day-to-day employment, CIA officials are pecu-
liarly likely to use information whose disclosure would cause the sorts of
harms described in Part II above.  It is quite another  thing to  say that
preclearance  is  required  whenever  a former  employee  having access  to
classified information seeks to publish something that relates to the gov-
ernment.  In the latter  case,  preclearance  may  deter and  delay  a  wide
variety of speech, and those costs may not be justified by a remote possi-
bility that dangerous information may be released.  Any such possibility
can be controlled  through less restrictive means,  including preclearance
when  classified  information is  included and  subsequent punishment  for
disclosure  of damaging information.
To say this is not to deny that employees owe a fiduciary duty to the
government and that ethical obligations should generally prevent govern-
ment  employees  from  disclosing  confidential  information.  Indeed,  per-
sonal loyalty and the perception of obligation probably explain  why the
government only rarely needs to impose sanctions for disclosure on past
or  present  employees.  These  ethical  obligations  argue  in  favor  of  a
refusal to confer legal remedies on the government.  Legitimate interests
can almost  always be served without resorting to censorship.
In  any  event,  the  first  amendment  question  should  turn  not  on
notions  of information  ownership, but on what sort of justification  the
government  is able to urge in support of the restriction.  The fact that the
employee  obtained  the information  as  a  result  of government  employ-
ment  provides no independent  reason for restricting the right to  speak.
3.  Interests as an Employer
A third argument  in favor of restricting the  speech of government
employees  is that the government  has interests as an employer that jus-
tify some regulation  of speech that could not be imposed if the speaker
were a private citizen.  The leading case is Pickering  v. Board of Educa-
tion.1"5  The issue there  was whether  a public school could  discharge a
teacher for sending a letter to a local newspaper  challenging a proposed
tax increase and criticizing the past revenue-raising  efforts of the public
105.  391 U.S.  563 (1968).
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schools.  The Court invalidated the discharge, noting that the statement
was not shown to have "impeded the teacher's proper performance of his
daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular opera-
tion of the schools generally."'1 6  The state as employer thus had no dis-
tinct  interest  that  would  justify  the  imposition  of  sanctions  on  the
employee.
The distinction between government as employer and government as
censor points to the appropriate considerations.  At a minimum, govern-
ment should not be permitted to impose sanctions on employees because
of their speech unless it can identify  distinct employer-related  interests.
This category  of interests, however,  is not self-defining.  Two questions
are  relevant  here:  whether  the  government  has  distinct  employment-
related  interests  that justify dismissal;  and  whether  those  interests  are
sufficiently weighty to justify the resulting restriction  of speech.
In its capacity  as  employer, the government  has two interests that
come  up in  many  contexts:  the desire to avoid  disruption  of working
relationships and the need to  set out a uniform official position.  Thus,
the government might argue that any expression of criticism by current
employees  prejudices  relationships  with  superiors.  This  view  was
rejected  in  Pickering. 1 07  Government  has  an  institutional  interest  in
exaggerating  the extent to which speech that is critical of current  poli-
cies,  or that discloses information, interferes  with the employment rela-
tionship.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  first  amendment  doctrine,  it  will  be
necessary  to examine  with care  any  claims either  that a close  working
relationship  will no longer be possible  as a result of the speech  or that
uniformity  is required.
Of course, the fact that the employee makes policy is a relevant con-
sideration, 1 08 and if the employee is in a position to speak for the United
States,  the claim for uniformity becomes more powerful.  For example,
no  constitutional question would be raised if the President discharged a
Secretary of Defense who criticized  executive policy in the Middle East.
The executive branch has an interest in presenting a uniform position  on
matters  of public  importance,  and  open  criticism  might  interfere  with
that interest.
To  explore  the contours  of employment-related  interests  in  detail
would take the discussion far from the central issue of governmental con-
trol of information.  For present purposes, it will be sufficient to suggest
that restrictions justifiably imposed because  of government's  interest  as
106.  Id. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
107.  Id.  at 570.
108.  See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.  507,  517-18  (1980);  Elrod v. Bums, 427  U.S.  347,  367-68
(1976)  (plurality opinion);  Coven,  The First  Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public  Employees,
12  HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L.  REV.  559  (1977).
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an employer will be much narrower than those that would be supportable
under either of the two arguments  examined above.  In addition, the dis-
tinction between government as employer and government as censor sug-
gests  that  the  class  of restrictions  on  speech  by  those  no  longer  in
government employment should be quite narrow, probably similar to the
class of restrictions  that might be imposed on those who had never been
employed  by the  government.  When  the speaker  has  left the  govern-
ment, the usual justifications-the need to present a uniform position, the
value  of  preserving  good  working  relations,  and  so  forth-drop  out.
There  are  also  important  implications  here  with  respect  to  current
employees.  Most significantly,  the employer-related interests  can gener-
ally be vindicated by discharge.  They will not usually support any sanc-
tion other than dismissal.
These considerations suggest that restrictions  on speech by govern-
ment employees will generally be difficult to justify.  With respect to for-
mer employees,  restrictions should almost always  be invalid unless grave
harm would be produced by disclosure-the same standard that governs
private speakers. 1 0 9  With respect to current employees, the only remedy
is discharge, and the question is whether distinctive  employment-related
interests justify  that remedy  when  it  would  infringe  upon  freedom  of
speech.
CONCLUSION
The Jeffersonian  understanding of free expression stresses the value
of citizen  deliberation in  ensuring  against self-interested  representation
and control of government by powerful private groups.  Both in general
and in its concrete applications, the equilibrium model of the first amend-
ment is unlikely to promote either goal.  It disregards the complex char-
acter of the relevant  institutional incentives; it ignores the fact that one
or the other of the countervailing forces may have insufficient power; and
it fails to present a baseline  from  which  to decide whether  the conflict
between secrecy  and disclosure has produced  a justifiable  result.
Exploration  of the more particular questions raised by government
control of technical  data and of speech  by government  employees  sug-
gests further defects in the equilibrium model.  Before reaching the issue
of  justification,  it is necessary to decide whether the speech  in question is
entitled to full first amendment protection or may instead be regulated on
the basis of a somewhat less powerful showing.  I have suggested  that at
least some technical data may be so regulated.  Moreover, regulation  of
speech by  government  employees  is frequently  justified  by  the  equilib-
109.  In  limited  contexts,  such  as  that  involving  the  CIA,  this  rationale  may  support
preclearance;  in  any event,  this is the most powerful argument in favor of the result in Snepp.
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rium model.  The traditional arguments for such regulation, however, are
unpersuasive.  In  particular,  the  notion  that  some  information  is
"owned"  by the government  is unacceptable.
These considerations suggest that the equilibrium theory  should be
modified  in four ways.  First, the burden of justification imposed on the
government should vary-as it does in current law-with the nature  of
the  speech  at  issue.  Second,  the  notion  of a  governmental  "property
interest"  in information should,  at least for most purposes, be rejected.
Third,  most  restrictions  on  disclosure  of information  by  government
employees  should be discarded:  ethical obligations, in conjunction  with
the power to discharge when employer-related  interests are at stake, gen-
erally will serve as a sufficient safeguard.  Finally, in some circumstances
a system of free  expression is unlikely to work well in the absence of a
right of access  to information held by government.
To say all this is not to suggest that the first amendment  imposes a
general obligation  of disclosure  on the part  of the government.  As  an
attempted  accommodation  of the  interests  in  secrecy  and  disclosure,
however, the equilibrium model rests on unsupported premises and over-
simplifies complicated problems.  If a solution is to be found for the prob-
lem of government  control of information,  it will be necessary  to  look
elsewhere.
The approach suggested here would draw on the Jeffersonian model
of free expression,  the distinction between categories of speech, and, per-
haps most important,  a particularized  understanding  of the contexts  in
which interests in disclosure and secrecy are likely to be powerful.  Such
an approach  would be most likely to recognize the occasional  need  for
secrecy without compromising the underlying  principles of public delib-
eration and self-government.
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